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Factual relativism

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Factual relativism (also called epistemic relativism, epistemological relativism, alethic relativism, and cognitive relativism) is the philosophical belief that certain facts are not absolute but depend on the perspective from which they are being evaluated.[1] It is often invoked in scientific contexts, such as Einstein's theory of relativity, where properties are shown to depend on the observers frame of reference.[2] This viewpoint allows for an easier understanding of context-based truth and challenges the assumption that all facts are objective.[1] According to factual relativism, facts used to justify claims are understood to be relative and subjective to the perspective of those proving or falsifying the proposition.[3]

History and Development

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Factual relativism is rooted in the idea that the standards for what counts as a rational belief can change depending on different cultural or conceptual perspectives. These standards don't have the universal truth they are known to have. This concept challenges the traditional view that there are objective, universal standards for determining what is true and rational. [2]

There are three main ideas behind factual relativism. The first is that beliefs are only justified depending on the context they are being observed from. This challenges the idea of true objectivity. The second is that there are many different perspectives and ways of thinking and some of those beliefs will clash. Lastly, factual relativism says that no one way of thinking is superior over the other. [2]

During the Scientific Revolution, factual relativism came into the debate between Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine. The two disagreed about how the planets move. Each used a different system. A relativist would argue that there isn't a true answer about which view is supported by the evidence because there are no set standards as to what evidence is true. In contrast, an anti-relativist would disagree and say one theory is better supported by evidence than the other. [2]

Philosopher Thomas Kuhn further influenced discussion of factual relativism with his idea of scientific paradigms. His belief is that what scientists consider facts depends on the dominant paradigm they work within, which can shift during scientific revolutions. [2]

In the field of anthropology, scholars like Peter Winch have explored how factual relativism plays out in non-Western cultures, such as the Azande tribe, whose belief in witchcraft is seen as rational within the context of their culture. This shows how factual relativism can help explain the legitimacy of different standards based cultural context. This sparked debates about whether it is even possible to compare beliefs across cultures using a single standard of rationality.[2]

Viewpoints

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One perspective compares scientific knowledge to the mythology of other cultures, arguing that science is merely a societal set of myths based on societal assumptions. Paul Feyerabend, in Against Method, argues that "The similarities between science and myth are indeed astonishing" and claims "First-world science is one science among many" (from the introduction to the Chinese edition). However, it is debated whether Feyerabend intended for these statements to be taken entirely seriously, as they may have been a critique of the claimed objectivity of science rather than a full support of the idea that science and myth are equally valid. [4]

The strong program in the sociology of science, in the words of founder David Bloor, argues that it is "impartial with respect to truth and falsity".[5] Elsewhere, Bloor and Barry Barnes have said "For the relativist [such as us] there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such."[6] In France, Bruno Latour has claimed that "Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature's representation, not the consequence, we can never use the outcome—Nature—to explain how and why a controversy has been settled."[7]

Yves Winkin, a Belgian professor of communications, responded to a popular trial in which two witnesses gave contradicting testimony by telling the newspaper Le Soir that "There is no transcendent truth. [...] It is not surprising that these two people, representing two very different professional universes, should each set forth a different truth. Having said that, I think that, in this context of public responsibility, the commission can only proceed as it does."[8]

The philosopher of science Gérard Fourez wrote, "What one generally calls a fact is an interpretation of a situation that no one, at least for the moment, wants to call into question."[9]

British archaeologist Roger Anyon told The New York Times that "science is just one of many ways of knowing the world... The Zuni's world view is just as valid as the archeological viewpoint of what prehistory is about."[10]

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness."[11]

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Epistemic Relativism

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Epistemic relativism shares a lot of similarities with factual relativism as they both question the objectivity of truth. Epistemic relativism says that knowledge depends on context and what counts as rational knowledge varies with different perspectives. This view challenges the idea of the objective standards used when evaluating knowledge, just like how factual relativism challenges the existence [2]of objective facts. Critics, such as Paul Boghossian argue that epistemic relativism can lead to epistemic incommensurability, which is where different knowledge systems are so different that they cannot be properly compared or evaluated.

The Self-Excepting Fallacy

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One of the main critiques against factual relativism is the concept of self-excepting fallacy, introduced by Maurice Mandelbaum in 1962. According to this critique, the relativist view is inconsistent as it requires the relativist to accept a universal claim about the nature of facts, even though relativism itself denies the possibility of universal truth. Because of this contradiction, few authors in the philosophy of science accept cognitive relativism.[12]

Philosophical Perspectives on Factual Relativism

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Larry Laudan's book Science and Relativism outlines the various philosophical viewpoints on factual relativism in the form of a dialogue.[13] This book contributes to the ongoing debate about factual relativism by presenting different perspectives on knowledge and how it relates to truth, objectivity, and cultural context.

Criticisms of Cognitive Relativism

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Cognitive relativism has been criticized by both analytic philosophers and scientists.[12][11] Critics argue that relativism's emphasis on knowledge being based around cultural and social contexts undermines the possibility of universal truths and objective knowledge. It can even be seen as a threat to scientific inquiry, as the scientific process revolves around objective methods and standards of evidence.

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ a b Einheuser, Iris (2008-08-14), García-Carpintero, Manuel; Kölbel, Max (eds.), "Three Forms of Truth Relativism", Relative Truth, Oxford University Press, p. 0, ISBN 978-0-19-923495-0, retrieved 2025-04-05
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Baghramian, Maria; Carter, J. Adam (2025), Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), "Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2025 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2025-04-06
  3. ^ Iris Einheuser, "Varieties of Relativism: Indexical, Propositional and Factual", from the Logos conference on RELATIVIZING UTTERANCE TRUTH, Barcelona, 2005.
  4. ^ Feyerabend, Paul (1992). Against method (Repr ed.). London [u.a.]: Verso. p. 3. ISBN 9780860916468.
  5. ^ "PhilosophyScience2". Retrieved August 11, 2012.
  6. ^ Barnes, Barry; Bloor, David (1982). "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge". In Hollis, Martin; Lukes, Steven (eds.). Rationality and Relativism. MIT. pp. 27–28. ISBN 9780262580618.
  7. ^ Latour, Bruno (1987). Science in action : how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 99. ISBN 9780674792913.
  8. ^ Sokal, Alan; Bricmont, Jean (1998). Fashionable nonsense : postmodern intellectuals' abuse of science. New York: Picador. p. 100. ISBN 9781466862401.
  9. ^ Fourez, Gérard (1992). La Construction des sciences, 2eme edition revue. Brussels:De Boeck Université.
  10. ^ Johnson, George. Indian Tribes' Creationists Thwart Archeologists, The New York Times, October 22, 1996
  11. ^ a b Baghramian, Maria; Carter, J. Adam (2018), "Relativism", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2019-10-08
  12. ^ a b Muncy, James A.; Fisk, Raymond P. (1987). "Cognitive Relativism and the Practice of Marketing Science". Journal of Marketing. 51 (1): 20–33. doi:10.2307/1251141. JSTOR 1251141.
  13. ^ Science and Relativism: Dialogues on the Philosophy of Science, ISBN 978-0-226-46949-2

References

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